1、 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ian Bond, Franois Godement, Hanns W. Maull, Volker Stanzel Rebooting Europes China Strategy May 2022, Berlin 群内每日免费分享5份+最新资料 群内每日免费分享5份+最新资料 300T网盘资源+4040万份行业报告为您的创业、职场、商业、投资、亲子、网赚、艺术、健身、心理、个人成长 全面赋能！添加微信：xxyg
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3、ftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ian Bond, Franois Godement, Hanns W. Maull, Volker Stanzel Rebooting Europes China Strategy May 2022, Berlin All rights reserved. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2022 SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Germa
4、n Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 34 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-200 www.swp-berlin.org swpswp-berlin.org doi: 10.18449/2022Special01 Table of Contents Foreword . 5 Rebooting Europes China Strategy: Key Points . 7 Introduction . 9 I
5、Europes Objectives . 11 I.1 Europes principles, norms, values and interests . 11 I.2 Europe between China and the US . 11 II The China Challenge: Partner, Competitor, Systemic Rival . 14 II.1 China as a partner . 15 II.1.1 Partnering with China on global challenges . 15 II.1.2 The case of climate ch
6、ange . 16 II.1.3 Global health and the COVID pandemic . 17 II.1.4 The case of WMD proliferation . 17 II.2 Co-operation and competition with China in markets . 18 II.2.1 Same bed, different dreams: China as a competitor . 19 II.2.2 A rigged domestic market in China . 19 II.2.3 Power trader: Chinas me
7、rcantilist challenge . 20 II.2.4 China and technological innovation . 21 II.2.5 Chinas commercial and diplomatic expansionism: the Belt and Road Initiative . 23 II.3 China as a systemic rival: the CCPs quest for power and influence . 24 II.3.1 Prosperity, wealth and (in)equality . 24 II.3.2 Totalita
8、rian China and the CCPs ideology . 25 II.3.3 Nationalism and minorities: the Chinese dream is ethno-nationalist . 27 II.3.4 The external dimensions of suppressing dissent . 29 II.3.5 Contradictions of Chinas international public diplomacy . 30 III America, China and The New Cold War . 33 III.1 A fra
9、ying Liberal Democratic International Order . 33 III.2 A new Cold War? The conflict between America and China (and how other powers fit in) . 34 III.3 Other great powers (Russia, Japan, India) . 35 III.4 Middle and smaller powers and the future of multilateralism . 39 Conclusions: A European Strateg
10、y for Relations with China . 40 A. Strategic objectives . 40 B. Five major components for a European strategy . 40 Ian Bond is the director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform. Prof. Franois Godement is Institut Montaignes Senior Advisor for Asia. Prof. Dr. Hanns W. Maull is a Senior
11、 Distinguished Fellow with the Executive Board of SWP. Ambassador (ret.) Volker Stanzel is a Senior Distinguished Fellow with the Executive Board of SWP and teaches at Hertie School in Berlin. Authors Analysis section: Hanns W. Maull, Volker Stanzel, Franois Godement, Ian Bond; Conclusions: Franois
12、Godement, Volker Stanzel, Hanns W. Maull, Ian Bond. The authors thank Institute Montaignes Claire Lemoine and Sara Furxhi for their support. Hanns W. Maull grate-fully acknowledges research assistance by Jonah Kaplan and Jake Spears. “Rebooting Europes China Strategy” is being published in parallel
13、by the Centre for European Reform in London: https:/www.cer.eu/publications/archive/report/2022/ rebooting-europe-china-strategy and Institut Montaigne in Paris: https:/www.institutmontaigne.org/en/publications/ rebooting-europes-china-strategy SWP Berlin Rebooting Europes China Strategy May 2022 5
14、We are pleased to introduce to you Rebooting Europes China Strategy. This report is the work of Ian Bond, Franois Godement, Hanns Maull and Volker Stanzel from our three institutes, and it has benefitted from the editing support of our staff. We hope it will be of interest to policy-makers as well a
15、s to the general public. The content and recommendations from this report are under the sole responsibility of its authors. Henri de Castries Chairman, Institut Montaigne (IM) Charles Grant Director, The Centre for European Reform (CER) Stefan Mair Chair of the Board and Director, German Institute f
16、or International and Security Affairs (SWP) Foreword SWP Berlin Rebooting Europes China Strategy May 2022 7 Key Points Rebooting Europes China Strategy The following analysis reaches a number of conclu-sions for the China policy of European countries, whether they are members of the EU or not. The k
17、ey points are as follows: The present assault on the Liberal Democratic International Order, in which China and Russia are openly co-operating, affects the interests of all democratic countries. To respond effectively, Europe first needs a shared understanding of its relationship with China; Europe
18、needs to ensure its own comprehensive security, with vulnerabilities ranging from cyber-space, fragile states in its neighbourhood, migratory pressures to military deterrence and defence. Only a Europe confident in its own security can contrib-ute to peace and stability elsewhere, including in the I
19、ndo-Pacific; While the US is the principal guarantor of the security of both Europe and of Americas partners in the Indo-Pacific, the worlds democratic powers are natural allies and must work together in considering strategies to adapt the international order to the challenge posed by China and by a
20、n authoritarian axis between Beijing and Moscow; Within that democratic consensus, Europe needs to develop strategies and means that contribute to the Indo-Pacific regions security; In its relationship with China, Europe also needs to reduce its vulnerabilities, enhance its leverage, and engage forc
21、efully with international organisations and multilateral institutions; Europe needs to engage with China on the basis of strict reciprocity; Europe needs to strengthen collective knowledge about China and its presence in Europe; The long-term goal of European China policy must be to support Chinas p
22、olitical, social and economic change, which in the past has benefited the Chi-nese people as well as many of the PRCs partners. Introduction SWP Berlin Rebooting Europes China Strategy May 2022 9 The Peoples Republic of China poses an immense challenge for the European Union, one unimaginable only a
23、 few years ago. This challenge comes at a par-ticularly difficult time. Vladimir Putins attack on Ukraine has shattered post-Cold War assumptions about the pan-European security order. The COVID-19 pandemic is still raging, imposing very real social and economic costs on Euro-pean countries. Europes
24、 security interests are threat-ened in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa. The consequences of Brexit have not been entirely digested yet, though the war in Ukraine is forcing London and Brussels to work together more closely on sanctions and other aspects of foreign and security policy. Wit
25、hin the Union, illiberal and populist governments are questioning its founding principles. Against the background of this multiplicity of chal-lenges, the EU sometimes struggles to assert itself globally, even though it is still the largest economic and trade entity in the world. China poses a chall
26、enge to Europes long-term economic sustainability, to its political freedom to act internationally, to its values and interests and, ultimately, to its security. This is not only a direct challenge, but one which grows out of Chinas sys-temic impact on the international system. European-Chinese disp
27、utes have been on the rise. In Europe, in the United States and in other demo-cratic market economies, the notion of decoupling has gained ground in response to newly-perceived risks in bilateral relations with China the risk of losing technological leadership and industrial com-petitiveness to Chin
28、ese companies backed by the Chi-nese state; and the risk of Chinese influence opera-tions undermining liberal values and subverting democratic politics. Decoupling can imply anything from keeping key military or dual technologies out of Chinas hands to severing ties that result in economic dependenc
29、e on China. China has been doing quite a lot of decoupling for itself, and its economic policies increasingly reflect the imperative of national security. The Chinese lead-ership has promoted a dual circulation strategy to strengthen Chinas self-reliance and to insulate it from foreign crises. It is
30、 steadily increasing con-straints on commerce and capital flows in the name of national security, and is changing the rules of the game for equity investment. Yet China maintains the commercial exchanges with the rest of the world that it deems either essential or profitable. During the global COVID
31、-19 pandemic, the countrys exports have significantly risen, often at the expense of Euro-pean companies. Both those strategies of decoupling and dual circulation seem to fly in the face of the powerful forces of globalisation that reflect the explosion of knowledge and technological innovation. Glo
32、balisa-tion connects individuals and societies across the globe ever more rapidly, broadly and deeply, and its consequences are more intrusive than ever. The nature of Europes interdependence with China, based on integrated industrial supply chains, is dif-ferent from its dependence on raw materials
33、, and especially fossil fuels, from Russia; the current rup-ture of most financial and economic links to Russia seems unlikely to be repeated in the case of China. Ties might weaken in certain sensitive areas, but overall European entanglement with China remains dense. Economic incentives will conti
34、nue to promote this entanglement, while political and strategic con-cerns seek to contain and curb it. European-Chinese interdependence will be contested politically, and thus trade-offs will have to be made between eco-nomic gains, threats to national security and political integrity. As for China,
35、 the Chinese Communist Partys overriding ambition is to remain in control of China. The Party will do everything it considers necessary to consolidate and enhance its power. If the CCP leader-ship considers meddling in other nations affairs as necessary, it will do so, as it has done in Australia, N
36、ew Zealand, Europe and even in the United States. Pragmatism persuaded China to open up to globalisa-tion and pushed it towards global interdependence. But concern about the CCPs hold on power demands that the leadership carefully channel and control the Introduction Introduction SWP Berlin Rebootin
37、g Europes China Strategy May 2022 10 implications of globalisation. Moreover, change through rapprochement can work both ways deepening economic interdependence has changed both China and its partners, including Europe. China can use globalisation against the West. As Chinas relative weight grows, i
38、t will lessen its own con-straints, allowing it to expand its influence abroad. China is now aiming to project itself globally with a toolbox that includes persuasion, coercion and corruption, and cyber action, mixing inducements, blackmail and threats. The depth, scope and range of interference in
39、other countries politics will be determined only by the motives and capabilities of the CCP leadership, not by any notions about appropriateness. How should Europe respond to the challenges of its entanglement with China? That is the central ques-tion this paper aims to answer. First, however, we ne
40、ed to clarify whom we mean by Europe. Who is Europe? For our purposes, Europe includes the European Union institutions, the EUs member states and also other European countries. Europes collective identity is expressed by the EU, but also by any group of Euro-pean states that act in line with the fou
41、r core ele-ments of its identity detailed below. Even its most influential member states cannot legitimately claim to represent Europe on their own, however Europe is a collective endeavour. Europe will need to base engagement with China on a definition of its values, interests and objectives that i
42、s shared among Europeans. Achieving this will require persistent political efforts to prevail against centrifugal tendencies within Europe and attempts by China to undermine a unified European voice. The nature of the European political process by itself favours long-term considerations over short-t
43、erm ones and prioritises moderation over emotion. This also makes it likely that European positions will be com-patible with those of middle power democracies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia or Canada, as well as with those of some ASEAN countries. In that sense, Europe seems well positioned i
44、n its ability to build coalitions a key source of soft power in todays international relations. I.1 Europes principles, norms, values and interests SWP Berlin Rebooting Europes China Strategy May 2022 11 I.1 Europes principles, norms, values and interests How should Europe define its interests and o
45、bjectives in its relationship with China? What will be the place in it for the liberal democratic values that Europe espouses? Can Europe avoid an economically damag-ing decoupling from China and maintain mutually beneficial ties while still remaining true to itself? European values and interests ex
46、press collective choices rooted in Europes history. How Europe relates to China should reflect this European identity. Europe will have to do more than just delineating what it is not, and instead clearly define what it is. A Europe that protects will ultimately fall apart if, for convenience or for
47、 commercial profit, it tries to stay aloof from the struggle over the future of the world order. We suggest a number of core elements that consti-tute the European identity: Europe is democratic, for some predominantly liberal, for others predominantly social, never exclusive of either. For all, it
48、is multi-lateralist, and it is increasingly espousing conserva-tion of resources and greening. Most Europeans today see the governance of their nations as irretrievably intertwined with the political values of the enlightenment and liberalism, but also with those of prosperity and social fairness. T
49、he way the EU functions in its day-to-day activities is a reflec-tion of that. This does not mean that liberal democracy will necessarily prevail in all member states at all times (significant deviations already exist), but it does consider an illiberal, authoritarian European Union, were it ever to
50、 come about, as no longer representa-tive of Europe. If a majority of member states, includ-ing its largest ones or its founding members, ceased to be liberal democracies, and if they succeeded in remoulding the EU into an illiberal, authoritarian entity, this would wreck the foundations on which th
