1、is the evolution that we plan to study so as to try and determine the type of environment that may justify the switch over from one approach to the other. A first part of this article will be dedicated to the transactional approach, a second one will stress the evolutions marking a change of centrat
2、ion, the third one will analyse the components of the relational approach which seemed to prevail in the mid nineties: this study will follow the evolution of the patterns of distribution over the course of time. A fourth part, centred on the Internet, will show how the American market makes those t
3、wo approaches live together. 1. The transactional strategy has for long dominated the market 1.1 The bases of the transactional approach As Leah points out (2000), mass marketing has for a long time rather well met the expectations of a “dying to consume“ Western society, without worrying about the
4、cost of gaining new clients. Betting on transactional marketing, in which the exchange is considered from the instant point of view, without any time continuity, most businesses have, for many years, put first and foremost the increase of sales volumes and therefore the increase of their market shar
5、es detrimental to the clients satisfaction and their loyalty. The valued approach was then to maximise the efforts on the research of new customers in a restricted and familiar competitive field with consumers eager to consume. The United States automobile market did not escape this tendency 1.2 A “
6、push” market with a strong transactional culture To put things into perspective, let us just remind a few figures. The sales of new cars on the American market vary between 15 and 17 million. It is a market where the key players alongside the three big American companies, are five Japanese, two Kore
7、ans and three Europeans (for those who count in terms of sales volumes). About 85% of the vehicles sold are assembled in 4 American factories. It is basically a market of replacement with a very active second-hand market (ratio of 2.5 between those two markets). Historically, this market has always
8、been a “push” market with a very big pressure from the manufacturers on the dealers. As a matter of fact, and up to the arrival of the Japanese manufacturers on the American market at the end of the seventies and their successful penetration at the beginning of the eighties, the Big Three (General M
9、otors, Ford and Chrysler) have benefited from a very comfortable situation. In a system where one only had to assemble to sell, the manufacturers had no trouble franchising dealers and making them sign drastic contracts. In a period of recession, the dealers were there to protect the factory and its
10、 workers from the vagaries of the market demand by absorbing fluctuations through large stocks of vehicles that would be waiting for hypothetical clients on their parking lots. The network was composed of a myriad of dealers and agents scattered all over the territory locked in business habits linke
11、d to an history of easy sales. In a thriving market, the exclusively American competition put up for sale identical products sold through harsh price negotiations, the only sales motivation used by dealers at the time. So, up to the end of the seventies, the only sales method was that of price barga
12、ining. The seller and the buyer would enter into a head-on confrontation where the basic motivation was to get the best possible deal. The elements of the bargain were four: the discount and type of financing offered by the dealer, the extras offered and the delivery time for the ordered vehicle. In
13、 case of selling the previously owned car a fifth element would come into play, the value given to the vehicle. In this bargain the dealer could easily have a very opportunistic behaviour, linked to the asymmetry of information that was favourable to him as he was the only one to know up to where he
14、 could go in terms of prices and various offers (Williamson, 1975). The client only had the binary choice of either accepting or refusing the offer made to him, bearing in mind that he was moreover a prisoner of his need to buy. The manufacturers themselves got trapped in this system as, even nowada
15、ys, the automobile press announces every week the special rebates offered by the manufacturers depending on the state of their stock turnover. Consequently, the vision the buyers have of the car seller is significant “the salesman is seen as an uneducated, pushy, fast-talking, overdressed con artist
16、 To the customer, buying a new car is like taking a trip back in time to an open-air market of the Middle East. The prices paid for identical cars vary widely, depending upon the negotiators skill. The bargaining process 5 is at bast unpleasant. Two-thirds of the customers loathe it”1. To what David
17、 Woodruff added “integrity is the key ingredient missing from the car retail business”2. The sellers were clearly installed in a logic of product selling: they were not at all interested in creating a lasting relationship with their client. 1.3 The arrival of new competitors on the market With the a
18、rrival of the Japanese in the seventies and the success met by their products on the small car market first, then for all the types of models, the market was completely upset It was upset not only in terms of market shares but also in terms of network structures and introduction of new sales methods
19、, both those last dimensions being, up to the middle of the nineties, the prerogatives of the manufacturers As a matter of fact, in ten years, the Japanese had created their networks from scratch and modified, from as early as the eighties, the selling proposition: more welcoming and better located
20、dealerships, with large exclusive territories but, most important, dealerships where the client was king with a strategy based on the principle of “zero-defect service” associated to a “zero-defect product” (the latter being the main characteristic attributed by the consumer to the Japanese offers).
21、 So, here we are at the beginning of the nineties, with a very diversified structure of the American automobile distribution. The number of key players on the American market has never been as high, competition on any segment of the market is fierce, and the size and sales volumes of dealerships go
22、from one end of the extreme to the other. All these in-depth modifications will push the Big Three to revisit their approach of the client and to use a marketing strategy that many called relational. So doing, they moved away from the bases of what used to be their customer relationship: a relations
23、hip based on a strict and deep transactional approach. The changes of the years 1995/2000 were going to question the structures of the networks and the sales methods. The first change was physical: modifying the location of dealerships and their outside design. Then came total network restructuratio
24、ns with new territories granted and a will to 1 M. Lazarus et G. Schneiner “One-Price Selling Works” : Price Selling Strikes Out”, Automotive News, July 26, 1993, p.14 2 D. Woodruff, “May we Help You Kick the Tires”, Business Week, August 3, 1992 p. 49 6 harmonise the look of the dealerships of the
25、different manufacturers (brand name strategy). Thus some new forms of distribution appeared: the cityshops. The second changeover stressed the necessity to enlarge the offer and gave birth to megastores. Then, a more and more acute need to better serve the consumer and to improve his buying comfort
26、led to the opening of automalls. These are the new forms of distribution we are going to introduce hereafter. 2. The beginning of a relational strategy: being consumer- orientated 2.1 A better taking into account of the clients needs The Big Threes strategies that had long prevailed were made rather
27、 obsolete by the arrival on the market of competitors whose main aim was to better serve their clients. Moreover, the American market had become a market where growth points were difficult to obtain and where models and brands were desperately looking for clients ready to buy them. Moreover the slum
28、p years had enabled the consumer to discover the diversity of a wider and wider offer and to turn to models and brands he would have ignored a few years before. Nowadays the consumer wishes to have his products everywhere and easily (quoted by Lehu, 2000), which will have as a consequence to make ne
29、w distribution offers appear, developed so as to meet this demand. 2.2 Being closer to the client: cityshops The American dealerships because of the size required to stock up numerous models of cars, indispensable in a deal strategy have been implanted in town suburbs, far from traffic flows and far
30、 from the public presence. With the desire to get closer to the client and to enable him to discover new models, dealers have implanted mini-dealerships in town, in shopping malls or even in office buildings, where two or three models are in the showroom and with the presence of only two or three sa
31、les advisors ready to inform but not to sell. The sales properly speaking will take place at the dealership after an appointment has been taken. Those cityshops, clearly, give a bigger presence and a higher visibility to the brand for a small investment and help bring the client closer to the produc
32、t. 7 2.3 Widening the offer and associated services: megastores/megadealers These private partnerships were very often born from a successful single-brand dealerships. They diversified by integrating other brands so as to be able to cover a whole range of cars going from the small Hyundai to the Cad
33、illac without forgetting the Japanese 4X4, the German sports car and the fashionable Swedish car. The price range is very wide and the new car stock is important. The sales concept linked to this type of dealership is called “one-stop shopping”. The potential buyer will find in a single location and
34、 with a single salesperson all the services linked to car buying (credit, insurance, other car products etc.). Those dealerships have lounges, kindergartens, drink machines, picnic areas. It is the beginning of the taking into account of the clients comfort. 2.4 Promoting single destination buying:
35、automalls/multi-brand shopping centers. We are speaking here of the concentration on a single location of independent dealers. On the American territory (USA/Canada), there were 122 automalls in 1991, 165 in 1995, 199 in 1997. It is estimated that their number will reach 350 in 2005 (JD Power). The
36、purpose of these centres is to share the expenses and to be envisaged as a single destination for car buyers. All the services linked to car buying can be found there as well as all the conveniences in terms of comfort, catering, entertainment, and chlidrencare so as to attract and make people stay
37、in the selling premises. In California, the state where they first appeared, automalls r 评评估估标标准准 权权重重 考考核核频频次次 数数据据来来源源考考核核人人 49.67 5%按月生产部分部经理50.13 48.40 1次5%按月本部门分部经理 5%20%按月本部门分部经理 98% 20% 按月品控部分部经理 20%按月生产部分部经理 100%10%按月本部门分部经理 0按月本部门分部经理 0按月安保部分部经理 环保三 废排放 指标达 标 10%按月本部门分部经理 98%5%按月生产部分部经理 17条
38、5%按月本部门分部经理 100% 原原料料分分部部配配料料班班长长 原原料料分分部部配配色色料料班班班班长长 维维度度指指标标项项定定义义计计算算公公式式评评估估标标准准 客客户户/ /市市场场 内部客户有效投诉次 数 经确认为本班责任的书面投 诉 有效投诉次数1条 内内部部运运营营 配制着色剂过程和结 果检查 每天对配制着色剂称量误差 和均匀度进行检查 称量误差不合格:210分次 均匀度不合格:210分次 98% 着色剂供给断链次数 着色剂供给缺料次数（责任 断链）、断链的时间累计 出现缺料：30分钟以内：5分 次；30分以上：10分次 着色剂的添加 着色剂向混合料中添加的及 时性与准确性
39、着色剂添加的及时性50%+着色 剂添加的准确性50% 98% 配着色剂设备的日常 保养率 参照相关规定，分部定期组 织检查 按照检查结果98% 生产、安全事故扣分 监测生产、安全事故造成的 生产损失情况，此项为扣分 项，不占权重 重大：20分次 一般：1020分次 小或事故隐患：10分次 重大工伤事故扣分 部门发生的重大安全事故死 亡人数，此项为扣分项，不 占权重 出现人员死亡：本次考核总分为0 重工伤：20分次 轻伤：520分次 小的工伤：5分次(超过5次 月后) 环保达标根据公司和部门相关规定 环保三废 排放指标 达标 上级指令完成执行率 上级下达工作指令或会议决 定任务完成情况 上级下达
40、工作指令或会议决定完 成件数/上级下达到部门工作指令 或会议决定任务件数 98% 学学习习合理化建议 本部门员工对公司经营管理 各环节提出的合理化建议 合理化建议的数量70有效采 纳率30% 4条 权权重重 考考核核频频次次 数数据据来来源源考考核核人人 5%按月本部门分部经理 20% 按月本部门分部经理 20%按月品控部分部经理 25%按月本部门分部经理 10%按月本部门分部经理 0按月生产部分部经理 0按月安保部分部经理 10%按月生产部分部经理 5%按月本部门分部经理 5%按月企划部分部经理 100% 原原料料分分部部配配色色料料班班班班长长 原原料料分分部部除除尘尘班班班班长长 维维度
41、度指指标标项项定定义义 客客户户/ /市市场场 内部客户有效投诉 次数 经确认为本班组责任的书面投诉 内内部部运运营营 除尘设备检查 在没有维修任务情况下每班检查一次，确 保及时发现故障隐患，并及时进行联系处 理。 混合料含碱量偏差 此项为部门关联指标 备件与机物料使用 计划的上报 根据除尘设备的运转情况，上报除尘设备 维修保养所需要的备件与机物料使用计划 。 维修计划的制定 协助工段制定维修计划，确保计划的制定 规范、合理、有效，上报及时。 除尘设备计划维修 保养 组织、带领班组人员，做好除尘设备的正 常维护、保养工作，确保除尘设备按时维 护保养。 除尘设备临时维护 在接到除尘设备异常报告后
42、，及时组织除 尘工到现场排查维护，确保维修及时、彻 底，故障按期恢复。 生产、安全事故扣 分 监测生产、安全事故造成的生产损失情况 ，此项为扣分项，不占权重 重大工伤事故扣分 部门发生的重大安全事故死亡人数，此项 为扣分项，不占权重 环保达标环保三废排放指标 上级指令完成执行 率 上级下达工作指令或会议决定任务完成情 况 学学习习与与发发展展合理化建议 本部门员工对公司经营管理各环节提出的 合理化建议 计计算算公公式式评评估估标标准准权权重重考考核核频频次次数数据据来来源源 考考核核人人 有效投诉次数1次10%按月本部门 分部经理 在没有维修任务情况下每班检查一 次70%+做好检修记录30%
43、98%20%按月本部门 分部经理 经测定合格的次数总的测检次数98%5%按月品控部 分部经理 计划的合理性50%+计划上报的及 时性50% 98%5%按月本部门 分部经理 计划的合理性50%+计划上报的及 时性50% 98%5%按月本部门 分部经理 维修保养的及时性30%+维修保养 时间性40%+维修保养完成率30% 98%20%按月本部门 分部经理 维修及时性30%+维修时间性70%96%20%按月本部门 分部经理 重大：20分次 一般：1020分次 小或事故隐患：10分次 0按月生产部 分部经理 出现人员死亡：本次考核总分为0 重工伤：20分次 轻伤：520分次 小的工伤：5分次(超过5次
44、 月后) 0按月安保部 分部经理 执行公司相关规定 环保三 废排放 指标达 标 5%按月生产部 分部经理 上级下达工作指令或会议决定完成 件数/上级下达到部门工作指令或 会议决定任务件数 98%5%按月本部门 分部经理 合理化建议的数量70有效采 纳率30% 4条5%按月企划部分部经理 100% 原原料料分分部部除除尘尘班班班班长长 原原料料分分部部修修车车班班班班长长 维维度度指指标标项项定定义义计计算算公公式式 客客户户/ /市市场场 内部客户有效投诉 次数 经确认为本班组责任的书面投诉有效投诉次数 内内部部运运营营 分部车辆检查 在没有维修任务情况下每班检查一次， 确保及时发现故障隐患，
45、并及时进行维 修处理。 在没有维修任务情况下每班检查 一次70%+做好检修记录30% 备件与机物料使用 计划的上报 根据车辆的运转情况，上报分部车辆维 修保养所需要的备件与机物料使用计划 。 计划的合理性50%+计划上报的及 时性50% 维修计划的制定 协助工段制定车辆维修计划，确保计划 的制定规范、合理、有效，上报及时。 计划的合理性50%+计划上报的及 时性50% 车辆维修保养 组织、带领班组人员，做好分部车辆的 正常维护、保养工作，确保车辆按时维 护保养。 维修保养的及时性30%+维修保养 时间性40%+维修保养完成率 30% 车辆临时维修 在接到分部车辆报修后，及时组织维修 工到现场实施维修，确保维修及时、彻 底，故障按期恢复。 维修及时性30%+维修时间性 70% 车辆大修 组织本班完成工段下达的车辆大修理与 技改攻关任务，确保大修车辆性能的恢 复。 （项目进度控制40项目质量 30项目成本控制30） 15%-5 生产、安全事故扣 分 监测生产、安全事故造成的生产损失情 况，此项为扣分项，不占权重 重大：20分次 一般：1020分次 小或事故隐患：10分次 重大工伤事故扣分 部门发生的重大安全事故死亡人数，此 项为扣分项，不占权重 出现人员死亡：本次考核总分为0 重工伤：20
