1、 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 University of Berkshire Hathaway A = Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
2、18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 University of Berkshire Hathaway A 30 Years of Lessons Learned from Warren Buffett Ive become a bass fi sherman in my old age. But in my lake, they do better with walleye at night.” Author Timothy Ferriss said, “As several veter
3、ans put it to me before the pilgrimage, Its like an MBA in a weekend. I thought this was hyperbole and hero worship, but I would now take it further: I think its one weekend that delivers more than most MBAs. Real-world strategies culled from experience? Check. Networking? Big-time check. The only t
4、hing the mecca of Buffett seemed to lack was the $100K+ price tag.” Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review I N T R O D U C T I O N xvi 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 terrifi ed of public speakin
5、g. (He used to get physically ill at just the thought of it.) Thankfully, over the years, Buffett and Munger have grown ever- more comfortable as educators. Today, they are excellent teachers. Their wisdom and willingness to share make each annual meeting an invaluable installment in a sublime lectu
6、re series. The Unstoppable Rise of Berkshire Hathaway Few on Wall Street would dispute the claim that Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger are the greatest investors of our time. Their genius in identifying and evaluating intangibles sets them apart. As a value investor, your ideal situation is to fi n
7、d a company increasing its intrinsic value. Ideally, the company would be one with a declining stock price, thus creating an even better bargain as time unfolds. No one has employed these principles more effectively than Buffett and Munger. Over the last 50 years, they have consistently sought to ow
8、n either all or part of good businesses, bought at bargain prices. In addition, to succeed using this approach, one must control ones emotions. Buffett and Mungers are set apart by their mastery at business valuation and relentless rationality in implementing this approach. The results of this have
9、been awe-inspiring. Under Buffett and Mungers leadership, Berkshire Hathaway has be- come one of the greatest business stories of the 20th and 21st centuries. A Short History Buffett was educated at the University of Nebraska. Afterward, he enrolled at Columbia Business School. He went there to lear
10、n from the father of value investing, Benjamin Graham. Buffett became Grahams star student. Afterward, Graham took him on at his investment partnership, Graham Newman. Buffett used what he learned from that experience to start his own partnership back in Omaha. He did phenomenally well from the very
11、 beginning. A $10,000 investment in his partnership in 1956 grew to $200,000 by 1969. Thats a 25.9% compounded annualized return. Incredibly, the partnership never had a down year, even though the market had six down years during that period. In 1959, Buffett met Charlie Munger, who was also from Om
12、aha, at a dinner party. Each man instantly recognized the intelligence of the Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 I N T R O D U C T I O N xvii other. Munger had worked i
13、n law, but Buffett convinced him that he should be in the investment business if he wanted to make real money.* Munger started his own investment partnership, Wheeler, Munger I was surprised by the price. Berkshire then had 1,583,680 shares outstanding. About 7% of these were owned by Buffett Partne
14、rship Ltd. (“BPL”), an investing entity that I managed and in which I had virtu- ally all of my net worth. Shortly before the tender offer was mailed, Stanton had asked me at what price BPL would sell its holdings. I answered $11.50, and he said, “Fine, we have a deal.” Then came Berkshires letter,
15、offering an eighth of a point less. I bristled at Stantons behavior and didnt tender. That was a monumentally stupid decision. Berkshire was then a northern textile manufacturer, mired in a terrible business. The industry in which it operated Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review A P
16、P E N D I X I : I N T H E B E G I N N I N G . . . 286 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 was heading south, both metaphorically and physically. And Berkshire, for a variety of reasons, was unable to change course
17、.”* “That was true even though the industrys problems had long been widely understood. Berkshires own Board minutes of July 29, 1954, laid out the grim facts: The textile industry in New England started going out of business forty years ago. During the war years this trend was stopped. The trend mus
18、t continue until supply and demand have been balanced. About a year after that board meeting, Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturingboth with roots in the 19th Centuryjoined forces, taking the name we bear today. With its fourteen plants and 10,000 employees, the merged compan
19、y became the giant of New England textiles. What the two managements viewed as a merger agreement, however, soon morphed into a suicide pact. During the seven years following the consolidation, Berkshire operated at an overall loss, and its net worth shrunk by 37%. Meanwhile, the company closed nine
20、 plants, sometimes using the liquidation process to repurchase shares. And that pattern caught my attention. I purchase BPLs fi rst shares of Berkshire in December 1962, anticipating more closings and more repurchases. The stock was then selling for $7.50, a wide discount from per- share working cap
21、ital of $10.25 and book value of $20.20. Buying the stock at that price was like picking up a discarded cigar butt that had one puff remaining in it. Though the stub might be ugly and soggy, the puff would be free. Once that momentary pleasure was enjoyed, however, no more could be expected. Berkshi
22、re thereafter stuck to the script: It soon closed another two plants, and in that May 1964 move, set out to repurchase shares with the shutdown proceeds. The price that Stanton offered was 50% above the cost of our original purchases. There it wasmy free puff, just waiting for me, after which I coul
23、d look elsewhere for other discarded butts. * Charlie Munger once referred to textiles as “congealed electricity,” so the move of pro- duction to the TVA southern states was inevitable. In his classically understated way, he con- cluded that the New England textile business was a “totally doomed, ce
24、rtain-to-fail business.” Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 A P P E N D I X I : I N T H E B E G I N N I N G . . . 287 Instead, irritated by Stantons chiseling, I ignore
25、d his offer and began to aggressively buy more Berkshire shares. By April 1965, BPL owned 392,633 shares (out of 1,017,547 then outstanding), and at an early-May board meeting, we formally took control of the company. Through Seaburys and my childish behaviorafter all, what was an eighth of a point
26、to either of us?he lost his job, and I found myself with more than 25% of BPLs capital invested in a terrible business about which I knew very little. I became the dog who caught the car. Because of Berkshires operating losses and share repur- chases, its net worth at the end of fi scal 1964 had fal
27、len to $22 million from $55 million at the time of the 1955 merger. The full $22 million was required by the textile operation: The company had no excess cash and owed its bank $2.5 million. (Berkshires 1964 annual report is reproduced on pages 130-142.) For a time I got lucky: Berkshire immediately
28、 enjoyed two years of good operating conditions. Better yet, its earnings in those years were free of income tax because it possessed a large loss carry-forward that had arisen from the disastrous results in earlier years. Then the honeymoon ended. During the 18 years fol- lowing 1966, we struggled
29、unremittingly with the textile business, all to no avail. But stubbornnessstupidity?has its limits. In 1985, I fi nally threw in the towel and closed the operation.” A Tutorial on Capital Allocation While Buffett grills himself for buying a dying textile business out of pique for Stanton Seaburys ch
30、iseling, we think he doth protest too much. In truth, Buffetts maneuvers in the years to follow constituted an amazing exercise in aggressive capital reallocation. Here are the numbers: In 1964, the year before Buffett took control, Berkshires per-share book value stood at $19.46 with per share earn
31、- ings of $0.15. At year-end 1969, Berkshires per-share book value was $43.18, up 120%, with per share earnings of $8.07. How the heck did Buffett do that with a dying textile business? Lets take a look. Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review A P P E N D I X I : I N T H E B E G I N N I
32、 N G . . . 288 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 Buybacks At the time of purchase, Berkshire was undergoing a dra- matic buyback program. In 1964, Berkshire bought in 469,602 shares, leaving 1,137,778 shares out
33、standing, a 29% cap shrink! Furthermore, this was done at an average price paid of $11.32 share, far below book value. Massive per share value was being created by shrinking the capitalization at very low prices. Under Buffetts command, Berkshire bought in an addi- tional 120,231 shares to further s
34、hrink the cap. In all, Berk- shires share count went from 1,607,380 in 1964 to 1,017,547 in 1969, a 37% reduction.* Hidden Value As of 1964, Berkshire had $5 million of “tax loss carry-overs.” With the accounting rules of the day, this asset was not included in the calculation of book value. In addi
35、tion, this asset could be especially valuable at the time since the top corporate tax was 48%. We estimate this asset added over $2 per share of value as Berkshire used up the tax loss carry-overs within a few years, sheltering a signifi cant portion of earnings from taxes. Investments Buffett creat
36、ed cash for investment through additional asset sales and reductions in inventory and overhead. He invested in securities that appreciated signifi cantly, liquidating the portfolio during 1968 and 1969. He reported net per share earnings from the gains on those sales of $2.20 ($1.49 from the parent
37、and $0.71 from insurance subsidiaries) in 1968 and $4.16 ($3.87 from the parent and $0.29 from insurance subsidiaries) in 1969, add- ing a total of $6.36 of after-tax value. * Compare this to just over 1.6 million shares outstanding today. Berkshire has had little share expansion over the past 50 ye
38、ars. Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 A P P E N D I X I : I N T H E B E G I N N I N G . . . 289 Acquisitions In 1967, Berkshire bought National Indemnity for $8.4 mil
39、lion, which became the base for building Berkshires insurance empire. As of the 1969 report, Berkshire was moving into surety, workmens compensation and reinsurance. In 1969, Berkshire purchased The Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of Rockford, Illinois. Earnings and Earnings Power With these tw
40、o new lines of business, Buffett transformed Berkshires earnings power. Of those $8.07 of per share earnings in 1969, $4.66 came from operations: $0.79 from the textile operation, $2.31 from the insurance subsidiaries and $1.56 from the banking operation.* The key to note here is that the bulk税率=838
41、6.5925.00%=2096.65（万元）。3、本项目达产年可实现利润总额8386.59万元，缴纳企业所得税2096.65万元，其正常经营年份净利润：企业净利润=达产年利润总额-企业所得税=8386.59-2096.65=6289.94（万元）。4、根据计算得到以下经济指标。（1）达产年投资利润率=43.21%。（2）达产年投资利税率=51.01%。（3）达产年投资回报率=32.41%。5、根据经济测算，本期工程项目投产后，达产年实现营业收入34844.00万元，总成本费用26457.41万元，税金及附加356.23万元，利润总额8386.59万元，企业所得税2096.65万元，税后净利润6
42、289.94万元，年纳税总额3609.65万元。六、项目综合结论1、要激发中小企业创业创新活力，就是要鼓励创办小企业，开发新岗位，以创业促就业，力争使中小企业数量持续增加，向社会提供更多的就业机会和岗位。要最大限度减少对微观事物的管理，市场机制能有效调节的经济活动一律取消审批，对保留的行政审批事项规范管理、提高效率；直接面对基层、量大面广、属于能交由市场解决或交由地方管理更方便有效的经济社会事项，一律下放地方和基层管理。同时，注重放管结合，切实防止审批事项边减边增、明减暗增现象发生。进一步加大商事制度改革的政策宣传。尽快建立与商事制度改革相配套的后续市场监管体系，加强部门间的沟通衔接，明确监管
43、责任，规范监管行为。2、项目场址周围大气、土壤、植物等自然环境状况良好，无水源地、自然保护区、文物景观等环境敏感点；项目承办单位对建设期和生产经营过程中产生的“三废”进行综合治理达标排放，对环境影响程度较小，职工劳动安全卫生措施有保障。项目承办单位该项目建设条件成熟，通过经济、技术、环境保护和社会效益等方面预测分析，投资项目具有经济效益和社会效益的双重收益，不仅项目的盈利范围大，而且抗风险能力强，同时，对于各种废弃污染物均有切实可行的治理措施，在取得较高经济效益的同时，也保护了自然环境；目前，项目承办单位实施投资项目的基本条件已经具备，因此，项目建设是完全可行的。充分抓住经济全球化、我国产业结
44、构调整的历史机遇，加快该项目的开发建设、招商引资，努力规避投资风险。同时，在产业布局和资金投向等方面要处理好多方面的协调关系，注重建立起良好的公共关系，加强与社会各阶层、政府相关管理部门的沟通，准确项目的定位，完善各项法定手续。充分抓住经济全球化、我国产业结构调整的历史机遇，加快该项目的开发建设、招商引资，努力规避投资风险。同时，在产业布局和资金投向等方面要处理好多方面的协调关系，注重建立起良好的公共关系，加强与社会各阶层、政府相关管理部门的沟通，准确项目的定位，完善各项法定手续。建议项目承办单位提前做好产品销售渠道及销售策略的策划设计工作，积极引进营销人才，使项目能够顺利实施并有利于项目后期
45、的经营运作。八、主要经济指标一览表序号项目单位指标备注1占地面积平方米54353.8381.49亩1.1容积率1.191.2建筑系数61.15%1.3投资强度万元/亩188.491.4基底面积平方米33237.371.5总建筑面积平方米64681.061.6绿化面积平方米4315.80绿化率6.67%2总投资万元19407.952.1固定资产投资万元15360.052.1.1土建工程投资万元5104.572.1.1.1土建工程投资占比万元26.30%2.1.2设备投资万元4074.952.1.2.1设备投资占比21.00%2.1.3其它投资万元6180.532.1.3.1其它投资占比31.85
46、%2.1.4固定资产投资占比79.14%2.2流动资金万元4047.902.2.1流动资金占比20.86%3收入万元34844.004总成本万元26457.415利润总额万元8386.596净利润万元6289.947所得税万元1.198增值税万元1156.779税金及附加万元356.2310纳税总额万元3609.6511利税总额万元9899.5912投资利润率43.21%13投资利税率51.01%14投资回报率32.41%15回收期年4.5916设备数量台（套）10617年用电量千瓦时1224232.8418年用水量立方米19547.4719总能耗吨标准煤152.1320节能率20.39%21
47、节能量吨标准煤62.1422员工数量人54982.2.1流动资金占比16.94%3收入万元11741.004总成本万元9222.475利润总额万元2518.536净利润万元1888.907所得税万元1.608增值税万元347.389税金及附加万元164.8910纳税总额万元1141.9011利税总额万元3030.8012投资利润率27.58%13投资利税率33.19%14投资回报率20.69%15回收期年6.3316设备数量台（套）6817年用电量千瓦时608943.1418年用水量立方米7102.4419总能耗吨标准煤75.4520节能率28.61%21节能量吨标准煤29.3422员工数量人199第二章 背景及必要性SEEPS是一种中分子量，学名为聚苯乙烯-b-聚(乙烯/乙烯/丙烯)-b-聚苯乙烯，由日本可乐丽(Kuraray)公司生产。SEEPS除了用在共混料中以外，还可用在聚合物改性、胶粘剂、密封材、涂料、电线电缆包覆护套以及相容剂等方面。SEEPS具有良好的耐候性和耐热性，并且具有极高的强度和充油能力，且充油后的SEEPS共混料具有柔韧性
